Recently, the Supreme Court of Appeal (‘the SCA’) delivered an important judgment on the limits of liability in claims instituted against the Road Accident Fund (‘RAF’). In Road Accident Fund v L M, the Court considered whether RAF could be held liable for a dependant’s claim where an injured breadwinner died by suicide more than two years after a motor vehicle collision. Critically, the ruling provides guidance on causation in motor vehicle accident claims by confirming that, although a collision may factually contribute to an individual’s suicide, this does not automatically establish liability under the law.
The facts of the case
In mid-2014, the deceased sustained serious orthopaedic injuries and a mild concussive injury in a motorcycle collision with a motor vehicle. His injuries resulted in disfigurement, chronic pain, permanent physical limitations, and a significantly reduced ability to perform manual labour.
Although he continued operating his business and sought alternative sources of income, the evidence demonstrated that the deceased experienced ongoing frustration, emotional distress, and financial pressure following the accident. In December 2016, approximately two and a half years after the collision, he died from a self-inflicted gunshot wound.
Before his death, the deceased had successfully pursued his own RAF claim for personal injuries. Following his death, his widow and minor children instituted a dependant’s claim for loss of support against RAF. In sum, they contended that the injuries sustained in the collision ultimately caused the deceased’s suicide, which deprived them of economic support.
The legal issue
The central question before the SCA was whether the collision caused the deceased’s death.
Under South African law, the element of causation involves two distinct enquiries. First, factual causation asks whether the harm would have occurred ‘but for’ the wrongful conduct. Second, legal causation considers whether the connection between the wrongful conduct and the harm is sufficiently close for liability to be imposed, or whether the harm is too remote as a matter of public policy. Crucially, both enquiries must be satisfied on a balance of probabilities for liability to arise.
Why the Court found factual causation
On the evidence, the SCA accepted that the motor vehicle collision fundamentally altered the deceased’s life as it resulted in injuries that caused chronic pain, permanent physical impairment, reduced earning capacity, and significant emotional suffering.
Importantly, the Court accepted that a person who suffers debilitating physical injuries may develop psychological sequelae, even where those symptoms do not amount to a diagnosable mental illness.
Applying the ‘but for’ test, the Court concluded that factual causation had been established. Referencing a description of the deceased as a determined and resilient individual who consistently adapted to adversity to support his family, the SCA found it improbable that, absent the compounding effect of his accident-related injuries and psychological distress, he would have taken his own life.
Why the RAF was nevertheless not liable
The matter, however, ultimately turned on legal causation.
The SCA emphasised that South African law recognises personal autonomy and self-determination. In the absence of evidence that a person’s capacity for autonomous decision-making has been impaired, a deliberate suicide is ordinarily treated as an exercise of free will.
In interpreting the law, the Court distinguished an earlier decision in Road Accident Fund v Russell, which the deceased’s dependants sought to rely on. In that case, the evidence proved that the collision had caused brain injury and resultant depression that materially impaired the deceased’s judgment.
By contrast, the expert evidence presented in this matter did not establish that the deceased suffered from a recognised psychological injury, mental illness, or condition that impaired his judgment or deprived him of the capacity for autonomous decision-making. While he undoubtedly experienced distress, anger, frustration, and despair, those emotions did not prove – on a balance of probabilities – that he lacked the capacity to exercise his own volition.
Accordingly, the deceased’s decision to take his own life instead constituted a novus actus interveniens that is a new intervening cause, which served to break the chain of causation.
Why suicide was not legally foreseeable
The existence of a new intervening act, however, does not automatically end the enquiry. In this instance, the SCA explained that liability may still arise if the suicide was reasonably foreseeable or sufficiently closely connected to the original wrongful conduct, being the conduct that led to the motor vehicle collision in 2014.
On the facts, the Court held that this threshold was not met. To that end, three key considerations proved decisive:
- First, approximately two and a half years had elapsed between the collision and the suicide, which weakened the legal connection between the accident and the eventual harm.
- Second, there was no recognised psychological injury, mental illness, or impairment of judgment that made suicide a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the deceased’s physical injuries. While he experienced significant emotional distress, the evidence did not establish that suicide was a probable manifestation of his condition.
- Third, the deceased’s character was significant. He was consistently defined as resilient, determined, and committed to supporting his family despite his financial hardship and physical limitations. Although his family recognised that he was distressed, his suicide came as a profound and unexpected shock. That evidence thus supported factual causation, but does not prove that suicide was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the accident.
For these reasons, the SCA concluded that legal causation had not been established and RAF could not be held liable for the dependants’ loss of support.
Why the judgment matters for motor vehicle accident claims
In the context of motor vehicle accident claims instituted against RAF, the ruling provides valuable guidance for future litigation involving the suicide of injured persons. It confirms that founding factual causation alone is insufficient. Claimants must also prove legal causation by demonstrating a sufficiently close connection between the accident and suicide.
Where the evidence establishes that the motor vehicle accident caused a recognised psychological injury or mental illness that materially impaired the deceased’s capacity for autonomous decision-making, liability may still arise. However, where the deceased retains that capacity, the deliberate decision to end their life will ordinarily constitute a new intervening cause unless the suicide was itself a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the injuries sustained, as determined by the factual nexus.
Conclusion
Affirming that liability in motor vehicle accident claims depends on each case’s unique facts, Road Accident v L M reinforces the importance of distinguishing between factual and legal causation and highlights the need for compelling psychiatric or psychological evidence where suicide follows a vehicular collision.
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